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Abstract  
In  order  to  continue  its  mission  in  preparing  educated  work  force  needed  for 
supporting  implementation  of  Estonian  economic  policy,  universities  need  to 
improve the usage of its scarce resources. We study the expectation and attitudes of 
academic  staff  towards  performance  appraisal  and  related  reward  systems.  Our 
survey and focus-group interviews revealed that although the systems deployed in 
those two Universities were different by its nature – Tartu had adopted performance-
based  approach,  where  performance  appraisal  results  were  closely  connected  to 
salary,  and Tallinn  University  of Technology  had  taken  position-based  approach, 
where general salary condition on the time of appointment play pivotal role – the 
expectations  of  staff  were  similar.  In  both  universities,  leaders  preferred  more 
measurable performance-based systems, but the rest of staff favoured more loose 
and  stable  approaches.  Implications  of  results  towards  appraisal  and  rewards 
systems for academic staff are discussed.  
Keywords: performance management, performance appraisal, pay-for-performance, 
academic staff,  university,  performance  appraisal  indicators and  methods,  perfor-
mance appraisal and remuneration systems. 
JEL Classification: M12, M48, M52, I20, I23 (i20, i23) 
1. Purpose, object of research and methodology  
The aim of the research is to prepare recommendations for developing performance 
management of the academic staff on the example in the Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration at the University of Tartu and in the School of Economics 
and Business Administration at the Tallinn University of Technology (hereinafter FE 
UT and SE TUT). As part of the research, research is conducted on performance 
appraisal (hereinafter PA) and remuneration systems for academic staff (teaching 
and research staff) at two leading public universities in Estonia.  
                                                                  
1 This research has been partially financed by the Estonian Science Foundation TiPS.  
2 Prof. Kulno Türk, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia, kulno.turk@ut.ee 
3 Elar Killumets (Ph.D student), University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia, elar@ejk.ee  
36 
 
The object of research is the performance management (hereinafter PM) systems for 
academic staff at the FE UT and SE TUT. Performance management has been consi-
dered to refer to a range of activities aiming at improving organizational effective-
ness. Articles adopting broad coverage of PM, encompass setting of goals on indivi-
dual, team  and  organizational  level,  development  and  training  of  employees and 
rewards systems in organizations. For the purposes of this research, the scope of PM 
is limited to the (1) performance appraisal and (2) reward systems of academic staff, 
enabling  more  in-depth  analyses  and  capturing  of  interplay  between  those  two 
components of PM (see figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Process and components of performance management 
Based on theory, the research methodology was developed, incorporating qualitative 
and quantitative methods. At first, exploratory analyses was conducted in FE UT 
involving  the  analyses  of  documentation  FE  UT  had  on  their  PM  routines  and 
systems,  focus  group  interviews  with  academic  staff,  interviews  with  experts  in 
related field and participatory observations. Based on results of initial grounding 
effort, questionnaire-based survey was developed to measure attitudes and expecta- 
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tions of academic staff towards performance management systems in both universi-
ties. The data collected during the survey was analyzed and results compared with 
theory and practice. As the data from FE UT was gathered over the period of 7 
years, analyses includes also review on  how the PM system has developed over 
time, ascertaining special features with respect to the economic crisis and the organi-
zation’s development cycle. As a result of the research, recommendations are propo-
sed  for  developing  performance  management  systems  suited  to  academic 
environments.  
To  determine  the  particularities  of  the  abovementioned  systems,  a  total  of  82 
academic staff were surveyed in 2012-2013 (2012 in FE UT and 2013 in SE TUT), 
three academics were interviewed at SE TUT and seven focus group discussions 
were conducted at the FE UT. Descriptive statistics analyses were used to analyze 
the results obtained.  
As part of performance management for academic staff, performance appraisal is 
linked with remuneration. Performance appraisal of academic staff is conducted at 
Estonian universalities mainly at the time of the candidate’s application and as part 
of  annual  reports,  and  only  in  a  few  cases  there  is  an  additional  (development-
oriented) annual performance appraisal system utilized. This research attempts to 
find answers to the following research questions. 
1.  How is academic staff appraised?  
2.  What  types  of  pay  systems  are  implemented  and  how  are  they  linked  to 
performance appraisals?  
3.  What kinds of methods and indicators for appraising performance of academic 
staff are used?  
4.  How does academic staff perceive various aspects of the performance appraisal 
and remuneration systems?  
5.  How are the performance appraisal methods and indicators developed? 
 
Performance  management  of  academic  staff  is  based  on  two  pillars:  (1)  annual 
performance  appraisals  and  (2)  corresponding  remuneration  decisions.  PM  is 
considered as an important management instrument on tactical level. Performance 
appraisal  of  academic  staff  may  be:  a)  position-based  and/or  annual;  b)  general 
and/or detailed; c) long- or short-term; d) quantitative and/or qualitative indicator 
based; e) objective and/or subjective; f) a combination of the above. A combination 
of different indicators and methods was used to appraise performance. In parallel to 
qualitative indicators and subjective assessment based evaluation, some cases saw 
the additional use of quantitative and objective indicator based annual evaluation. 
The subjective and position-based appraisal of academic staff takes place as part of 
the appointment to the position and is based on general, long-term and qualitative  
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indicators. The academic staff pay system can be a) position-based (salary scale and 
basic wage based); b) market-based (work and salary market based); performance 
based  (performance  appraisal  based);  d)  a  combination  of  the  above.  The 
performance based systems for remuneration are based on the annual performance 
appraisal and comprise a unified performance management system.  
2. Theoretical overview 
PM generally 
For the purpose of current study, performance management is defined as a manage-
ment  instrument,  consisting  of  (1)  performance  appraisal  and  (2)  remuneration 
connected  to  results  of  appraisal.  The  goal  for  performance  management  is  to 
increase performance and align means of performance appraisal with strategic goals 
of an organization (Decramer et al. 2013; Stanton, Nankervis 2012).  
PM  enables  the  consolidation  of  work  effort  of  individuals  and  work  teams  for 
achieving strategic goals of the organization. Integration of also extra-organizational 
groups (stakeholders) into this system enables creation of highly effective strategic 
performance cycle (Hunton et al. 2009). PM is also an integral part of managerial 
control system aimed at employee work activities and work results. Three integral 
components  can  be  indentified  -  inputs,  process  and  outputs.  Several  authors 
(Kagioglou et al. 2001; Mone et al. 2011) have emphasized the need to look beyond 
measuring end results (outputs), but focus also on inputs (what resources were used), 
process  (how  the  results  were  actually  achieved)  and  by  what  extent  they  were 
developed during the performance cycle.  
Goal of PA in process of PM is to give evaluation to work results, give feedback and 
improve work performance. PA as a term is significantly narrower that PM, focusing 
only on evaluative component of PM, but the aim is still on improving work results 
(Gravina,  Siers  2011).  Latest  literature  emphasizes  the  need  to  look  beyond 
appraisal's evaluative component and looks at it as two-component bundle, where 
the  focus is  also on  developmental  side of  the  appraisal  process  (Gravina,  Siers 
2011;  Edler  et  al.  2012). Appraisal  is  primarily  based  on  past performance. The 
focus  of  PA  can  be  individual  employee,  a  team  or  organization  as  a  whole, 
including both their work results and activities (processes). And during the appraisal 
process  also  several  administrative  functions  are  being  carried  out:  control  and 
documentation of employees work performance, and transformation of performance 
data into comparable form.  
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The trend is in linking results of performance appraisal with pay. Those forms of pay 
are called pay-for-performance (hereinafter PFP) or performance-related-pay, where 
the  level  of  remuneration  is  connected  to  employee's  contribution  to  fulfilling 
organizational goals (Hartog, Verburg 2004; Neal 2011). In western management 
culture,  PFP  has  been  a  dominant  practice  already  from  the  beginning  of  20
th 
century,  as  the  issue  of  PFP  occupied  a  pivotal  role  in  principles  of  Scientific 
Management. 
The central idea behind PFP systems, where work outputs or results of appraisal are 
connected to employees’ salary, is to ensure increased work motivation and thus 
improve  results  on  individual  and  company  level.  This  has  been  emphasized  in 
several in different motivational theories, including (but not limited to) goal-setting 
theory, expectancy theory, and most dominant of them  - the agency theory. The 
belief in positive impact of those practices is not uniform though. Already in 1968, 
Frederick Herzberg expressed in his seminal piece "One More Time, How Do You 
Motivate  Employees?"  concerns  regarding  effectiveness  of  using  money  as 
motivator. And  he  was not  alone  with  his  concerns,  as several  other  researchers 
arrived on similar conclusions (for example Camerer, Hogarth 1999; Deci, Ryan 
2000; Deming 2000; Scholtes 1993; Semler 1989). For example Edwards Deming 
(2000) notes that organization is a complicated system of interconnected processes; 
but  PFP  forces  managers  to  use  simple  incomplete  measures  that  are  easily 
manipulable,  fail  to  crasp  the  interconnectedness  of  organization  and  therefore 
leading to suboptimization of processes. That in turn result in negative outcomes on 
organizational level, although individual performance outputs may improve at the 
same time. 
To conclude, dominant body of research emphasizes positive effect of PFP systems 
on (individual) performance (Jenkins et al 1998; Stajkovic, Luthans 1997; Prender-
gast 1999; Laursen 2002; Atkinson et al. 2009; Gielen et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2013). 
Although  one  must  say  that  the  research  in  2000ies  have  abandoned  simple 
straightforward approach to PFP systems and started to acknowledge the complexity 
of issues related to both positive and negative aspect of using PFP. Like Gerhart et al 
(2009) have stated in their literature review article, there is no simple "yes" or "no" 
answer to the question regarding effectiveness of PFP systems, but there is strong 
evidence that PFP has positive impact on motivation and in most of occasions where 
PFP is used, there are negative implications present that are difficult to avoid.  
When usage of PFP systems is considered to have positive impact on quantitative 
aspects of work, there is no positive impact found to exist between PFP and quality 
of work. Although it has been found to that incorporation of quality-dimensions into 
work performance  management  and PFP systems is possible and useful (Hartog,  
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Verburg 2004), then in majority of research has failed to find positive impact or 
reports negative impact of PFP systems on quality (Rosenhtal, Frank 2006; Camerer, 
Hogarth 1999). Use of PFP is successful in case of simple (especially physical) jobs, 
where  there  is  direct  visible  link  between  effort  and  output  and  performance 
management  can  be  based  on  quantitative  measures.  However,  in  case  of 
knowledge-intensive  work  (like  scientist  work),  this  may  not  be  the  case.  The 
motivation to engage in knowledge intensive work in mostly intrinsic and PFP is 
found to reduce this intrinsic motivation (Kallio, Kallio 2012).  
PM in public sector 
Performance  appraisal  is  incorporated  into  management  of  public  sector 
organization under the concept of the New Public Management (NPM). NPM was 
first introduced in 1980ies and aimed at modernization of management practices 
utilized by public sector. And the NPM has not lost its actuality also today. NPM 
uses  more  narrow  approach  to  performance  management,  focusing  mainly  on 
appraisal and pay-components. Performance appraisal has become a central issue in 
discussions over performance management in public sector. In 70ies public sector 
both in Europe and USA focused on control of outputs and adoption of management 
by objectives approach (MBO). In 1980ies the next step was made with introduction 
of  NPM,  which  serves until today  as an  ideological  foundation  for  management 
philosophy of public sector in many countries.  
Similarly, public sector has extensively adopted PFP systems. According to OECD 
reports,  majority  of  member  countries  have  implemented  PFP  systems  as 
management tools in public organization (Cardona 2007). When there is wide body 
of  literature  from  research  conducted  in  private organizations  that  show  positive 
connection between PFP and work results, then in public sector the success stories 
are scarce or considered to be unreliable (Gielen, Kerkhofs, Ours 2010).  
In conditions of scarce resources and declining budgets, public sector is forced to 
implement more effective performance management methods, mostly adapted from 
private sector. Although  it  has resulted  in  more  intensive  control  of  outputs  and 
usage of explicit standards, also several positive trends have taken place. Namely, 
decentralization  of  management,  larger  scope  of  management  and  autonomy  in 
decision making, self-management and increased transparency of activities (Melo, 
Sarrico, Radnor 2010; Bogt, Scapens 2012). 
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PM in academia 
Performance appraisal is topical also in management of academic staff and is based 
largely on further developments of NPM. Analyze of researches done on performan-
ce appraisal in academia revealed that increased competition between universities 
served as the driver for implementing improved performance management systems 
and resulted in greater focus on appraising the performance of both faculties and 
staff.  And  in  linking  the  results  of  those  appraisals  with  pay  and  career 
advancements. As a result, the level of professionalism in managing faculties and 
academics has increased. Also, the measures on how the performance is evaluated 
have become more diverse.  
Similarly to private sector and public sector, the research on effectiveness of the use 
of PFP systems (and linking appraisals with pay level) in academia have not reached 
consensus.  For  example  Bogt,  Scapens  (2012)  argue  that  performance  appraisal 
inhibits  the  creativeness  of  both  teaching  and  research.  And  as  the  pressure  on 
funding  on  university  level  is  increasing,  so  does  the  focus  on  individual 
performance evaluations and associated level of stress of academic staff. Another 
observable  trend  is  increase  in  authority  and  power  of  non-academic  staff 
(managers) in decision making and decline of academic voice and freedom (Melo, 
Sarrico, Radnor 2010). 
Performance  management  measures,  including  appraisal  and  remuneration, 
associated  with  several  problems.  Some  problems  can  be  attributed  to  the 
inappropriateness  of  the  tool  to  the  environment  of  academia,  but  there  is  also 
certain proportion of problems that can be traced back to incorrect or incomplete 
utilization  of  those  tools.  Research  has  established  several  dilemmas  in 
implementation of performance management - uncertainty of science (lack of clear 
"activity - result" link), verification of performance measures, transparency in public 
provision of information and actions taken to meet those goals (Zia, Koliba 2011). 
Those potential problems are magnified, if performance appraisals are conducted 
unilaterally,  are  hierarchically-based  and  as  a  result  foster  fear.  In  that  case  the 
appraisal  becomes  distorted  and  instead  of  motivating  effect,  it  results  in 
demotivation and loss of job satisfaction (Pascal, Marschke 2008). Second set of 
issues can be attributed to multitude of goals that a university faces - it needs to 
balance  its  resources  and  efforts  between  high-level  international  research, 
development  of  national  scientific  and  higher-education  systems,  educating 
specialists for job market, cooperation with local companies and community etc. 
Performance management has led to increased number of publications, especially in 
journals ranked as "high tier" by university performing appraisals. To generalize the  
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results  of  implementing  those  tools  in  academia  -  what  gets  appraised,  gets 
improved. The problem, however, is that increase in quantity of publications have 
led to lowered quality of those publications (Gil-Anton 2011). As a result, in order to 
decrease negative aspects of quantitative measures, British universities have started 
to combine measurement of performance with greater degree of academic freedom 
and development. And in order to further decrease the dominance of quantitative 
productivity measures and impact of financial performance indicator, other systems 
have been introduced, that are based on qualitative-measures, including for example 
EFQM (Bogt, Scapens 2012). Performance management systems of academic staff 
must serve to foster development and should be focused towards constant improving 
the  quality.  Quantitative  measures  widely  established  as  a  base  for  appraisal  in 
academia have failed to serve its purpose; therefore the systems should be balanced 
with qualitative measures.  
3. The practice of performance management of academic staff at FE UT and SE 
TUT 
 
Using  performance  management,  performance  targets  are  set  for  academic  staff, 
their performance is evaluated, and their activities are guided and supported to link 
the individual goals and actions of academic staff with the university’s objectives 
and  to  ensure  employees’  motivation  and  career.  Academic  staff  performance 
management systems are implementation in the world’s universities with varying 
thoroughness and based on targeting and timescale levels.  
A key component of performance appraisal is a multi-faceted feedback system, the 
effectiveness of which is predicated on openness and free exchange of information. 
To ensure this, collective decision-making systems (councils) and appraisal inter-
views are used. The classical system for performance appraisal in the framework of 
the appointments to a position is related to strategic management of university and is 
based above all on long-term goals.  
Because  of  the  multiple  dimensions  and  complexity  of  measuring  performance, 
universities  mainly  use  traditional  position-based  (qualification-based)  academic 
staff  performance  evaluation,  which  in  turn  is  related  to  the  salary  system.  The 
professional  suitability  of  academic  staff  is  generally  evaluated  at  Estonian 
universalities at the time of the candidate’s application and as part of general annual 
reports  and  only  in  some  cases  (FE  UT)  is  additional  thorough  and  detailed 
academic staff performance evaluation systems utilized.  
Remuneration of academic staff is based on university-wide legal acts, which are 
essentially similar to each other and consist of a basic salary and performance pay  
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and  bonus  for  fulfilling  additional  duties.  The  evaluation  of  academic  staff  and 
determination of basic salary is based on whether the requirements defined in the job 
description  are  fulfilled  and  financial  resources  at  the  disposal  of  the  specific 
structural unit. The basic salary is generally agreed upon in the employment contract 
for the entire term of the appointment depending on the position and the minimum 
level  of  the  basic  wage,  the  duration  of  the  working  time  and  work  conditions, 
except for FE UT, where the remuneration (including basic salary) is adjusted based 
on the annual performance assessments. With regard to performance appraisal and 
remuneration system, EF UT is unlike the others, as performance evaluation and 
remuneration principles used at companies are used here. 
Targeted management are the predominant methods used for appraising performance 
of universities and their subunits (faculties, institutes). As part of this method are 
balanced  scorecard  in  FE  UT,  under  which  the  most  important  quantitative 
indicators related to universities’ primary objectives are used: e.g., number of top-
ranked journal publications, defended doctoral dissertations, number and scope of 
international  and  local  projects,  ability  to  secure  research  grants,  the  level  of 
competition  between  students  wanting  to  enter  different  curricula  etc.  These 
indicators are also part of academic staff remuneration system, having significant 
impact  on  salary  levels.  Compared  to  European  universities,  implementation  of 
targeted management have granted universities in Estonia more freedom in making 
decisions on  usage  of  appraisal  and  remuneration  systems  (Estermann,  Nokkala, 
Steinel 2011).   
The evaluation indicators used must undergo continued development based on the 
universities’ development and priorities; among other things, consideration must be 
given  to  the  impact  of  the  top-ranked  journal  publication  sources  and  level  of 
influence of researchers, receiving research grants and projects, assessments of the 
up-to-datedness of curricula, the number of younger academics, competitiveness in 
the labour market etc, and also, to a greater extent, indicators that gauge the quality 
of the work, development of academic staff at the universities and their subunits. 
Use  of  these  indicators  is  complicated  and  requires  subjective  evaluation,  the 
reliability  of  which  would  in  such  a  case  be  placed  in  question  –  the  more 
substantive and significant an indicator, the harder it is to gauge it reliably. Even the 
level  competition  for  admissions  to  a  university  is  difficult  to  compare,  as  the 
curricula of universities in different cities and the potential of the education market 
vary and are changing constantly. 
  
Academic staff performance appraisal at the SE TUT takes place above all pursuant 
to the basic requirements for the position; and an annual performance appraisal is 
not  conducted  because  it  is  considered  to  be  too  complicated,  subjective  and 
conflict-prone.  The  appraisal  interviews  conducted  with  academic  staff  and  the  
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surveys of student feedback conducted centrally at the university as a whole are not 
very representative. Problems related to academics and teaching discussed above all 
in an unofficial manner. For 1-3-year-long employment contracts, this is not as criti-
cal as it is for longer employment contracts, which is why it is sufficient to evaluate 
suitability for a position in the course of the appointment process. However, the 
drawback of the system currently in use is that academic staffs seek a minimum 
workload and accept the basic salary established by the institute head and dean as 
specified  in  the  fixed-term  employment  contract  –  they  are  not  motivated  to  do 
additional work. A lower workload would allow savings on working time and allows 
them to work as consultants and trainers for the private sector on the side, as this is 
higher-paid than the work they do at the university.  
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Table 1. Appraisal and reward practices of academic staff in FE UT and SE TUT  
Performance 
management 
FE UT  SE TUT 
Goal setting  Main  goals  of  the  organization; 
detailed  goals  for  faculty  and 
academic  staff;  yearly  review 
process. 
Vision  and  main  goals  of  the 
organization;  general  goals  for 
faculty  and  academic  staff;  review 
process once in 3 to 5 years, depen-
ding on duration of work contract. 
Evaluation 
criteria  and 
process  of 
appraisal 
Position-based  demands  towards 
research, teaching and development; 
appraisals criteria for each 3 groups 
are objective, detailed and predomi-
nantly quantitative. Appraisal is con-
ducted  by  direct manager  using  ag-
reed evaluation criteria once a year. 
Appraisal  criterion  is  approved  by 
council. Quality of teaching is moni-
tored regularly by direct supervisor. 
Position-based  demands  towards 
research, teaching and development. 
Appraisal  is  conducted  by  special 
committee when work contract starts 
to expire, usually once in every 3 to 5 
years.  Annual  reviews  are  random 
and  dependent  on  initiative  of  each 
individual  supervisor.  Quality  of 
teaching  is  monitored  regularly  by 
direct supervisor. 
Base salary  Base  salary  dependent  on  position, 
value  determined  by  university's 
general  salary  instruction;  annual 
review  of  salary  levels  is  based  on 
results  of  appraisal.  Criteria  for 
appraisal  and  corresponding  results 
are made public. 
Base  salary  dependent  on  position, 
value  determined  by  university's 
general  salary  instruction. Rules  for 
differentiation of base salary not set 
and  results  of  appraisal  not  made 
public. Decisions are based partially 
on market price. 
Performance-
based pay  
 
PFP of up to 30% of base salary, is de-
pendent  on  annual  appraisal  results. 
Extra rewards for accepting additional 
work  activities.  Additional  one-off 
rewards in case of publishing in high 
level  journal,  receiving  a  grant  or 
mentoring a defended dissertation. 
Extra rewards for accepting additional 
work activities or doing better work. 
Additional one-off rewards in case of 
publishing  in  high  level  journal  or 
mentoring  a  successfully  defended 
dissertation. 
 
This problem is further amplified by the cuts in bonuses and performance pay due to 
budget constraints – before the economic crisis universities could pay out close to 40 
percent of the salary fund as bonuses, in recent years only up to 20 percent has been 
available. Thus competitive, high personal salaries can be used in only a few cases.  
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Although  salaries  of  academic  staff  are  much  higher  than  the  minimum  salaries 
established at the SE TUT for the corresponding positions, they are not high enough 
or motivating compared to the salary level at companies in Tallinn.  
Performance appraisal of academic staff at the FE UT is based on the university-
wide  requirements  for  academic  staff  but  this  is  complemented  by  an  annual 
performance  appraisal.  The  system  fulfils  the  role  of  a  significant  management 
instrument at the faculty, being the basis for management accounting and financial 
management as well. As no management instrument, not even performance appraisal 
by itself, is capable of ensuring the organization’s goals and providing sufficient 
steering for the activities of the organization, subunits and individuals, it has to be 
applied hand in hand with other management instruments (personnel policy, quality 
and  programme  management  etc).  The  insufficient  implementation  of  the  other 
management instruments creates additional problems in performance management, 
which are compounded by the funding problems stemming from the economic crisis 
and the negative trends on the education market, which have led to an increase in 
insecurity in guaranteeing and providing remuneration for positions. 
A very important role in the performance management of academic staff in FE UT is 
played  by  the  detailed  quantitative-indicator-based  annual  performance  appraisal 
system  (the  so-called  point  system).  It  is  based  on  evaluation  of  last  year's 
performance  in  teaching  and  on  past  three  year’s  performance  in  research.  The 
system has been applied since 1995 and it has been developed further each year in 
cooperation with academic staff. Evaluation of teaching is based above all on the 
number of papers defended under supervision of the academic staff and amount of 
teaching in lecture format, which is adjusted depending on level of study, form of 
instruction  (teaching  classes  on  weekends),  language  of  instruction,  number  of 
students and qualification (only in the case of instruction in lecture form).  
As to research, the number of publications is taken into account, adjusted depending 
on  the  place  of  publication,  with  the  aim  being  to  appraise  the  quality  of  the 
research. The publications are grouped into 30 groups the difference in weights of 
which is 60-fold – the lowest rating is assigned to an article in a popular science 
periodical and the highest is given to a publication in a speciality, international high 
impact factor journal. The difference between weights assigned to ratings based on 
the source is quite detailed and extensive, but even this does not allow the quality of 
research to be assured to the desired extent. Part of the academic staff adapts quickly 
to the system; they seek out easier publishing opportunities and do not focus on the 
actual quality of the content of the research. Although annual adjustments of the 
indicators for performance appraisal or their relative weights allows to reduce the 
abuse of the evaluation system and ensure better conformity with the actual aim of  
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goals set, it remains a serious challenge and source of ineffectiveness. Mingers & 
Willmott (2012) have summarized those challenges by stating that academic staff in 
universities  do  not  engage  in  managing  performance,  but  rather  in  shaping 
performance, when, in order to publish needed number of articles, scientist "play 
safe" and avoid controversial topics. 
Performance appraisal systems are in essence quantitative or qualitative, which is 
mainly related to the short- or long-term goals of the organization and are past-based 
or future-oriented. A qualitative and long-term-goal and future-oriented performance 
appraisal  system  is  related  above  all  to  appointment  of  academic  staff  to  their 
positions, which allows more of a development orientation, but is more subjective 
compared to an annual performance review based on quantitative indicators. The 
attitudes of academic staff toward quantitative performance review systems vary, 
with SE TUT academic staff (as opposed to FE UT) desiring further development of 
a  quantities  indicator  based  performance  appraisal  system,  the  average  ratings 
(referred to here as “averages”) being 3.3 and 2.2, respectively (see Table 2). The 
desire of FE UT academic staff to develop quantitative performance review systems 
(a so-called point system) has also diminished sharply over time – there was a much 
greater  preference  for  this  in  2007  (average  3.2).  This  has  been  replaced  by 
discussions about simplification of the system (including the system of counting the 
number and value of publications) and greater reliance on nominal working hours 
and position-based salary (see Table 2) 
 
Table 2. Perceptions of academic staff of FE UT and SE TUT regarding performance 
appraisal and PFP systems. (scale: 1 - not; 2 - rather not; 3 - rather yes; 4 - yes). 
Question  FE 
UT 
SE 
TUT 
Mann-
Whitney 
U-test 
Annual performance appraisal of academic staff is necessary  3,3  3,2   
System of performance appraisals should be further developed based 
on so called point-system  
2,2  3,3  .00 
Appraisal results should be directly reflected in salary decisions   3,0  3,2   
The  significance  of  qualitative  measures  of  teaching  should  be 
increased in pay-for-performance systems 
3,0  2,8   
System for evaluating publications should be simplified  3,1  2,6  .01 
The system of pay-for-performance should incorporate all aspects of 
work   
3,2  3,2   
The system of pay-for-performance should be based primarily on 
nominal work hours and position-based pay 
2,5  2,1  .03 
The system of pay-for-performance should be based on significantly 
simplified performance appraisal system 
3,3  2,8  .00  
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FE UT academic staff has experienced the shortcomings of the quantitative perfor-
mance appraisal system and therefore, more than TUT, favour a simpler, more long-
term-goal-oriented review and pay system (average 3.3 and 2.8 respectively; see 
Table 2). Academic staff’s research is evaluated in three-year cycles, and they want 
their teaching to be evaluated in the same way, with longer-term indicators. The 
performance  review  system  that  is  the  basis for  remuneration  would  need  to  be 
simplified  or  a  detailed  performance  review  system  should  be  disengaged  from 
remuneration  and,  instead,  linked  above  all  with  employee  development.  In  the 
opinion of academic staff, simpler, longer-term-goal-oriented performance manage-
ment systems also will lead to better cooperation between employees and a values-
based approach with respect to the organization’s goals. 
 
Attitude towards the current appraisal process in FE UT was dependent on position. 
Researchers and senior-researcher expressed the pressing need to disconnect apprai-
sal and reward systems (see Table 3) and base salaries on position and nominal wor-
king hours. Instead of improving the existing quantitative "point-approach", they'd 
rather simplify existing system. Lecturers, however, would prefer a systems where 
appraisals and PFP systems would be even stronger integrated (average 3.2 and 2.2 
respectively; see Table 3). In addition, they would increase the proportion of qualita-
tive measures that concern the teaching-component of their jobs in the PFP systems. 
Table 3. Perceptions of academic staff of FE UT regarding performance appraisal 
and PFP systems (scale: 1 - no; 2 – rather not; 3 – rather yes; 4 – yes) 
Question  Professor, 
associate 
professor 
Lectu-
rer 
Resea-
rcher 
Annual performance appraisal of academic staff is necessary  3,6  3,2  3,2 
System of performance appraisals should be further developed 
based on so called point-system 
2,1  2,5  1,6 
Appraisal results should be directly reflected in salary decisions  3,2  3,2  2,2 
The significance of qualitative measures of teaching should be 
increased in pay-for-performance systems 
3,3  3,0  2,8 
System for evaluating publications should be simplified  3,0  3,1  3,3 
The  system  of  pay-for-performance  should  incorporate  all 
aspects of work   
3,0  3,4  3,1 
The system of pay-for-performance should be based primarily 
on nominal work hours and position-based pay 
2,3  2,5  2,8 
The  system  of  pay-for-performance  should  be  based  on 
significantly simplified performance appraisal system 
3,1  3,3  3,6  
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Funding of the FE UT’s institutes and chairs and academic staff salary policy is 
transparent  (discussed  and  approved  in  the  faculty  council)  and  depends  on  the 
fulfilment of indicators for teaching, research and development as regulated by the 
performance  appraisal  system.  The  performance  ratings  are  directly  linked  to 
remuneration, culminating in annual appraisal interviews and salary negotiations. 
Despite the complicated system for performance appraisal, this has paid dividends 
over many years; still, it started to slow FE UT development above all in economic 
crisis conditions. The results of current study show that the shortcomings of the 
annual performance management system become amplified in these conditions and 
the academic staffs are more and more bothered by the complexity, administration 
and resource-intensity of the system (time-consuming nature).  
The performance appraisal and pay system in use has motivated the academic staff 
to do more work, which has led to an increase in their workload. In the course of a 
study that mapped working time for FE UT academic staff, it was shown that they 
estimate their own work time as an average of 58 hours a week (taking into account 
all the activities related to the position). Such a workload causes frustration and has 
a negative effect on the quality of the work. Heavy teaching workload or pressure on 
increasing the number of publications keeps them from attaining the quality of work 
that  they  are  capable of.  Orientation  to quantity  has led  to  staff  adapting  to  the 
performance indicators and in some cases manipulating them, which have strained 
relations between subunits and employees  – Mingers, Willmott (2012) reached a 
similar  conclusion.  The  existing  academic  staff  performance  appraisal  and  pay 
system motivates spending of financial resources, and does not encourage procuring 
of  resources.  Many  teaching  staff  has focused  on  raising  their own  performance 
rating  and  increasing  their  remuneration,  not on  securing  additional  funding  and 
developing their own abilities and their subunit – a change in this attitude is one of 
the most important tasks in development of the performance management system. 
The opinions submitted in FE UT academic staff group discussions and interviews 
and in the short answer part of the survey forms regarding performance appraisal 
and pay system are similar on most issues. Academic staff believes that the perfor-
mance appraisal system is necessary and important but that it is very detailed and 
cumbersome and needs to be simplified. Many academic staff feels that insufficient 
attention to quality is a problem, above all with regard to teaching work. Opinions 
vary in some cases regarding feedback from students. Thanks to regular feedback 
from students, which tends to be representative, most academic staff accepts the stu-
dent ratings as personal feedback which is a good source of background information 
and can determine “problem” subjects and teachers. Even so, some of the academic  
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staff see use of student reviews as one component of the performance appraisal as 
posing  a  threat  to  quality  of  teaching.  It  is  emphasized  that  drawing  specific 
conclusions and implementing measures requires deeper analysis in each situation. 
In addition to the abovementioned primary shortcomings, a number of conflicting 
opinions were also expressed: 1) the performance appraisal system is too detailed 
versus all activities and results are not sufficiently considered; 2) employees’ low 
sense of job security versus the need for rapid changes. The conflicting opinions 
point  on  one  hand  to  different  interests  and  goals  and  on  the  other  they  signal 
frustration among some academic staff who considers the root of the problems to lie 
in the performance management system. Some of the academic staff accuses the 
performance management system of causing their workload to increase (at the same 
or less pay); generally they are justified in criticizing its shortcomings but fail to 
consider the global reasons behind it.  
Salary  committees  were  formed  to  develop  the  FE  UT  performance  system  and 
seven group discussions were held with these committees, moderated by the author. 
The  first  salary  committee  developed  and  proposed  two  alternative  performance 
review systems, inter alia 1) modifications to the existing quantitative performance 
appraisal system; 2) a performance appraisal system based mainly on qualitative 
indicators was developed. The latter was used as the basis for developing a new 
model  for  the  performance  appraisal  and  remunerations  of  professors’.  The 
following indicators were initially proposed for evaluating professors’ performance: 
(1) the amount of teaching on the doctoral level, (2) defence of doctoral dissertations 
and master’s theses supervised by the professor, (3) student ratings in all subjects 
taught over the last three years, (4) receiving research grants and (5) taking part in 
projects,  (6)  publishing  in  top-ranked  journals,  (7)  Google  Scholar  H-index,  (8) 
social visibility and (7) service to society. 
It can be argued that the FE UT performance management easier system serves its 
purposes and it is adjusted and balanced depending on the problems that have arisen 
and  based  on  annual  priorities.  Nevertheless,  academic  staff  criticism  of  the 
performance  appraisal  and  pay  system  being  utilized  has  increased  since  the 
beginning of the economic crisis. The academic staff claim that they have already 
for many years been forced to do more work for the same or even less pay and this 
has also strained relations between employees. Some lecturers also decry the high 
teaching workload and insufficient motivation, which is also negatively impacted by 
the uneven distribution of academic workloads. More and more dissatisfaction is 
expressed with regard to the performance appraisal system; among other things the 
negative impact on internal motivation is stressed. It has been argued that perfor-
mance appraisal plays too dominant role in management of FE UT, and it has weak  
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links to strategic-, programme- and quality management and personnel policies. The 
performance  management system is oriented to quantity (versus quality) and the 
individual  (versus  team)  and  public  disclosure  of  performance  appraisals  is  not 
considered to be sufficient. 
Academic staff has criticized the quantitative-focus of current performance appraisal 
system.  Even  though,  when  a  qualitative-criteria-based  performance  appraisal 
system was proposed in the course of salary reform in 2013, many changed their 
opinion and once again supported the existing quantitative performance management 
system. The system was seen as a key guarantee for ensuring one’s interests would 
be  looked  after,  while  qualitative  evaluation  was  associated  with  subjective 
assessment,  which  in  turn  was  seen  as  a  threat  in  coping  with  changes.  The 
paradoxes  listed  above  were  occasioned  by  the  complexity  of  integrating  the 
academic staff interests with the goals of the university structural unit, which are 
amplified  by  the  major  changes  facing  the  subunits.  To  overcome  them,  first  it 
would be necessary to develop long-term goals – setting such goals would allow 
staff to focus their activities on raising the quality of teaching and research, based on 
the main goals of the university. 
 
Summary  
 
In  conditions  of  negative  demographic  situation  and  decreased  availability  of 
resources for higher education, the  budgets of universities and their subunits are 
under strain. In order to continue providing high quality service to the society and 
provide  sufficient  support  for  economic  policy  of  moving  towards  knowledge-
intensive services and production, universities need to improve the usage of scarce 
resources. One way how universities have addressed this challenge is by making 
steps  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  management.  More  specifically  -  adopting 
modern performance management systems into their management practices. Similar 
trends can be captured both in the University of Tartu and in the Tallinn University 
of Technology.  
 
Using  complex  and  detailed  performance  management  systems,  academic  staff 
activities can be shaped and managed in a more robust way, albeit thereby restricting 
the freedom to pursue the activities that would trigger internal motivation. Those 
systems can ensure the external motivation of staff and therefore making sure that 
the assigned tasks are fulfilled as required. However, there are also downsides of 
those  practices.  Extensive  use  performance  management  tools  like  performance 
appraisal combined with pay-for-performance has started to slow the development 
of universities and their subunits. More specifically, these conditions have created 
excessive  competition  between  academic  staff  that  in  turn  results  in  reduced  
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cooperation. As a result, there is growing criticism and scepticism on whether these 
systems are suitable for use in academic context. 
Performance management systems used in faculties of Economics of University of 
Tartu and Tallinn Technical University have some similarities. Both universities use 
profession-based performance appraisals that take place (depending on duration of 
work contract) in every 3 to 5 years. UT however has implemented also additional 
yearly  appraisal  system,  where  short-run  work  result  (quantitative  measures  like 
number of articles published and teaching load to mention only some) are being 
evaluated. As a recent development, TU has modified the system by adding also 
qualitative element that takes into consideration elements of academic activities that 
are not quantifiable but are crucial in fulfil the mission of TU.  
 
Quantitative  component  of  performance  appraisals  of  academic  staff  enables 
measurement of "visible" activities - teaching load (in contact hours) on different 
stages  of  study,  number  of  research  paper  or  dissertations  mentored,  number  of 
articles published  in  high-value  outlets  etc. The  effectiveness  of  research  is  also 
measurable also by the sums of research grants received. Quantitative component of 
appraisal  offers  solid  base  for  performance  management  and  helps  to  prioritize 
efforts and provide control over budgets and resource allocations. But his tends to be 
rather  short-run  tool  that  fails  to  provide  solid  support  for  long-run  goals  of 
organization. To fill the gap, introduction of qualitative aspect of appraisal can be 
the  solution.  It  has  been  argued  that  having  development  in  mind,  qualitative 
component may be more precise and effective than quantitative approach, making it 
easier to promote cooperation, sharing of ideas and participation in policy-making.  
Although  the quantitative  aspect  (and  its link  to  pay  systems) has deep  roots  in 
performance  management  practices  in  universities,  the  opinions  of  staff  over  its 
effectiveness are not uniform. Supporters of quantitative measures of appraisal tend 
to  be  those,  who  have  not  exercised  this  approach  themselves.  Those  who  are 
sceptical emphasize the need to balance those (short-run) measures with more stable 
and long-run goals n order to ensure focus on constant improvement in the quality of 
both  research  and  teaching  even  in  conditions  of  scarce  funding.  Also,  as  the 
motivation to engage in knowledge intensive work is primarily intrinsic, the usage 
of quantitative measures in appraisal should be handled with care.   
Still, performance management system is just one management instrument. In order 
to keep one component of the performance management system from dominating 
and exerting a one-sided influence on teaching and research, it is necessary to use 
other management instruments as well, to mention quality management tools as one 
possible option  
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AKADEEMILISTE TￖￖTAJATE TￖￖSOORITUSE JUHTIMINE TARTU 
ￜLIKOOLI JA TALLINNA TEHNIKAￜLIKOOLI 
MAJANDUSTEADUSKONDADE NÄITEL 
 
Elar Killumets
1, Kulno Türk
2 
Tartu ￜlikool 
 
Uuringu eesmärgiks on välja selgitada akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate t￶￶soorituse juhtimise 
(sh  hindamise  ja  t￶￶tasustamise)  arengusuunad  Tartu  ￜlikooli  ja  Tallinna 
Tehnikaülikooli  majandusteaduskondade  näitel.  Selleks  viiakse  läbi  Eesti  kahe 
juhtiva  avalik-￵igusliku  ülikooli  majandusteaduskondade  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate 
t￶￶soorituse (edaspidi TS) hindamise ja t￶￶tasustamise süsteemide alased uuringud. 
Uuringu  objektiks  on  Tartu  ￜlikooli  (edaspidi  Tￜ)  ja  Tallinna  Tehnikaülikooli 
(edaspidi TTￜ) majandusteaduskondade (edaspidi MJ) akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate TS 
juhtimise  süsteemid.  Uuringu  käigus  määratakse  kindlaks  uuritavate  ülikoolide 
v￵rreldavate  allüksuste  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  TS  hindamise  ja  t￶￶tasustamise 
süsteemide eripärad ja tehakse ettepanekud nende arendamiseks.  
 
TS  juhtimise  all  m￵istetakse  käesolevas  uuringus  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  TS 
hindamist  ja  t￶￶tasustamist.  Kuigi  teaduskirjanduses  on  levinud  ka  laiemad  TS 
juhtimise käsitlused (h￵lmavad ka organisatsiooni arendamist, eestvedamist ja/v￵i 
väärtuste juhtimist), uuritakse käesolevas t￶￶s akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate TS hindamise 
ja t￶￶tasustamise, sh tulemustasustamise aspekte ning nende koostoimet. TS juhti-
mise  kui  juhtimisinstrumendi  p￵hikomponentideks  on  t￶￶tajate  TS  hindamine, 
tagasisidestamine  ja  arendamine  organisatsiooni  strateegilistest  eesmärkidest 
lähtuvalt.  Selle  raames  kogutakse  ja  edastatakse  infot  t￶￶tajate  ja  allüksuste 
(gruppide)  t￶￶protsesside  ja  -tulemuste  kohta,  mis  aitab  luua  infobaasi  ka 
organisatsiooni  juhtimisarvestuseks  ja  aruandluseks  nii  kvantitatiivsete  kui  ka 
kvalitatiivsete  hinnangute  raames,  v￵imaldades  siduda  indiviidide  ja  gruppide 
t￶￶alase tegevuse organisatsiooni strateegiliste eesmärkidega. TS juhtimine on ka 
juhtimiskontrolli osa, mille raames v￵ib eristatakse kolme lahutamatut komponenti: 
sisend, tegevus (t￶￶protsessid) ja t￶￶tulemused.  
 
TS juhtimise peamiseks komponendiks on TS hindamine (performance appraisal), 
mille  raames  hinnatakse  t￶￶tajate  t￶￶tulemusi,  antakse  tagasisidet  ja  arendatakse 
t￶￶tajaid. T￶￶tajate TS hinnangud seotakse sageli ka nende t￶￶tasustamisega, mida 
nimetatakse tulemustasustamiseks (pay for performance, performance-related pay), 
mille eesmärgiks on t￵sta t￶￶tajate motivatsiooni oma t￶￶ suhtes ja tagada paremad 
t￶￶tulemused.  Paljud  teadlased  suhtuvad  sellesse  skeptiliselt  (Herzberg  1968, 
Camerer, Hogarth 1999; Deci, Ryan 2000; Deming 2000 jt), paljud peavad seda aga 
organisatsiooni tulemuslikkuse tagamise oluliseks instrumendiks (Prendergast 1999; 
Laursen  2002;  Atkinson  et  al.  2009;  Gielen,  Kerkhofs,  Ours  2010  jt).  Ka 
viimatinimetatud teadlaste uuringutest selgub, et tulemustasustamine on keeruline 
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juhtimisinstrument  ning  sellega  kaasnevad  sageli  negatiivsed  k￵rvalm￵jud.  ￜhel 
meelel ollakse selles, et t￶￶tajate tulemustasustamist on otstarbekas rakendada siis, 
kui  pingutuse  ja  tasu  vahelised  seosed  on  lihtsad  ja  kvantitatiivselt  m￵￵detavad, 
kvaliteedi tagamisel on tulemustasustamise v￵imalused aga piiratumad.  
 
TS  juhtimist  hakati  2000-ndatel  ulatuslikumalt  rakendama  lisaks  erasektorile  ka 
avalikus  sektoris  nn  uue  haldusjuhtimise  (NPM)  kontseptsiooni  raames,  mis  oli 
tingitud  avaliku  sektori  organisatsioonide  madalast  efektiivsusest  ja  riigieelarvete 
pingestumisest.  Kuigi  avaliku  sektori  organisatsioonides  on  täheldatud  v￵rreldes 
eraettev￵tetega vähem positiivseid seoseid tulemustasustamise ja t￶￶tulemuste vahel 
(Gielen,  Kerkhofs,  Ours  2010),  on  uus  haldusjuhtimine  jätkuvalt  aktuaalne  ka 
käesoleval ajal. Näiteks 2/3 OECD liikmesriike rakendab avalikus sektoris tulemus-
tasustamist  ning  peab  seda  efektiivseks  juhtimisinstrumendiks  (…  2005  Elari 
allikas?).  NPM  p￵him￵tete  rakendamine  on  v￵imaldanud  suurendada  ka  avaliku 
sektori  organisatsioonide  iseseisvust,  juhtimisvabadust  ja  paindlikkust, 
detsentraliseerida juhtimist ja t￵sta avalikustamist.  
 
TS juhtimine on aktuaalne ka ülikoolide akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate juhtimisel ning selle 
rakendamisel  on  v￵imalik  tugineda  NPM  kontseptsioonile.  ￜlikoolide  eelarvete 
pingestumine  ja  nendevahelise  konkurentsi  teravnemise  haridusturul  on  toonud 
kaasa vajaduse t￵sta akadeemiliste üksuste ja indiviidide tulemuslikkust, milleks on 
samuti  hakatud  rakendama  äriettev￵tete  juhtimisinstrumente,  sh TS  juhtimist.  Ka 
akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate TS hindamise ja tulemustasustamise rakendamise otstarbe-
kuse osas esineb nii negatiivset (Bogt, Scapens 2012; Sousa, Nijs, Hendriks 2010), 
kui  ka  positiivset  suhtumist  (Atkinson  et al.  2009;  Decramer,  Smolders, Vander-
straeten 2013). Kui äriettev￵tete tulemuslikkuse hindamisel on v￵imalik keskenduda 
selle  objektiivsetele  näitajatele  (näiteks  käibele  ja  kasumile),  siis  haridusasutuste 
kvalitatiivseid eesmärke on palju keerulisem usaldusväärselt m￵￵ta. TS hindamise 
kriitilised  dilemmad  ongi  p￵hjustatud  eelk￵ige  keerukatest  hindamisnäitajatest 
ja -süsteemidest ning m￵￵tmistulemuste ebapiisavast usaldusväärsusest. Objektiiv-
setele  ja  kvantitatiivsetele  näitajatele  tuginemine  m￵jub  negatiivselt  aga 
akadeemiliste allüksuste ja t￶￶tajate t￶￶ kvaliteedile. TS hindamine v￵imaldab küll 
tagada kvantitatiivsete näitajate täitmise ja ületamise, kuid sageli kvaliteedi hinnaga. 
Selle  vältimiseks  on  vaja  rakendada  muid  kvalitatiivsetel  näitajatel  p￵hinevaid 
juhtimisinstrumente, sh näiteks kvaliteedijuhtimise süsteeme. 
 
Teooriale tuginedes t￶￶tati välja uurimismetoodika, milleks kasutatakse dokumen-
tide  analüüsi,  ankeetküsitlust,  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  ja  fookusintervjuusid  ning 
osalevat  vaatlust.  Nimetatud  süsteemide  eripärade  kindlaks  määramiseks küsitleti 
2012-2013 aastal Tￜ ja TTￜ MJ-s kokku 82 akadeemilist t￶￶tajat ning intervjueeriti 
3 juhti ning viidi läbi 7 fokuseeritud grupiarutelu. Saadud tulemuste analüüsimiseks 
kasutatakse kirjeldavat statistikat.  
 
Akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate TS  (tulemuslikkust)  hinnatakse  vaadeldavates  ülikoolides 
esmalt ametikohale valimise kaudu ning Tￜ MJ-s täiendavalt aastaaruannete ning 
iga-aastaste  detailsete  TS  hindamise  süsteemide  abil.  Uuringus  püütakse  leida  
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vastused  järgmistele  uurimisküsimustele:  Missuguseid  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  TS 
hindamise näitajaid ja meetodeid kasutatakse ning kuidas neisse suhtutakse? Kuidas 
t￶￶tatakse välja TS hindamismetoodika ja -näitajad ning mil määral osalevad selles 
akadeemilised  t￶￶tajad?  Missuguseid  t￶￶tasustamise  süsteeme  rakendatakse  ja 
kuidas  need  on  seotud  TS  hindamisega?  Uuringu  tulemusena  t￶￶tatakse  välja 
soovitused ülikoolide akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate TS juhtimise arendamiseks. 
 
Tￜ ja TTￜ MJ akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate TS hindamine on korraldatud erineval viisil, 
sh  oluliselt  täpsemalt  Tￜ-s  ja  selle  MJ-s,  kus  eesmärgilise  juhtimise  raames  on 
koostatud arengukavad ja rakendatakse  BSC metoodikat. BSC süsteemis peetakse 
arvestust  ligi  kahekümne  näitaja osas,  sh näiteks üli￵pilaste  arv  ja konkursi  tase 
erinevatel  ￵ppetasemetel,  tipp-publikatsioonide  arv,  kaitstud  doktorit￶￶de  arv, 
teadus- ja rakendusprojektide maht, üli￵pilaste ja t￶￶tajate rahulolu jt.  
 
Tￜ MJ akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate t￶￶ on detailse hindamissüsteemi abil palju täpsemalt 
eesmärgistatud, sh nii ￵ppe-, teadus- ja arendust￶￶ osas. Nii Tￜ MJ kui ka TTￜ MJ 
kasutatakse  ametikohast  (kvalifikatsioonist)  lähtuvat  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  TS 
hindamise  ja  t￶￶tasustamise  süsteemi.  P￵hipalkade  määramine  leiab  esmalt  aset 
t￶￶kohale valimise (v￵i määramise) käigus, mil arvestatakse ametijuhendi n￵uete 
täitmist, sh tuginetakse ￵ppet￶￶ kvaliteedi hindamisel ka üli￵pilashinnangutele. Tￜ 
MJ-s viiakse iga-aastaselt läbi ka akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate ametlik detailne hindamine 
(nn punktisüsteem), mille tulemuste alusel korrigeeritakse ka hinnatavate p￵hipalku.  
 
Iga-aastane täiendav TS hindamine p￵hineb kvantitatiivsetel näitajatel, sh ￵ppe- ja 
arendust￶￶ osas m￶￶dunud aasta t￶￶tulemustel ning teadust￶￶ osas viimase kolme 
aasta  t￶￶tulemustel.  Vaadeldav  TS  juhtimise  süsteem  on  oluliseks 
juhtimisinstrumendiks, sh juhtimisarvestuse ja finantsjuhtimise aluseks ning seda on 
arendatud  igal  aastal  koost￶￶s  t￶￶tajatega  edasi.  Õppet￶￶  hindamisel  lähtutakse 
eelk￵ige akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate juhendamisel kaitstud uurimist￶￶de ja kontakt￵ppe 
mahtudest,  mida  korrigeeritakse  olenevalt  ￵ppetasemest,  ￵ppevormist  (t￶￶ 
nädalavahetustel),  ￵ppekeelest,  üli￵pilaste  arvust  ja  t￶￶taja  kvalifikatsioonist 
lähtuvalt. Teadust￶￶ puhul arvestatakse publikatsioonide arvu, mida korrigeeritakse 
olenevalt  publikatsiooni  avaldamise  allikast,  sooviga  niimoodi  hinnata  teadust￶￶ 
kvaliteeti.  Publikatsioonid  on  rühmitatud  ligi  30-sse  gruppi,  millede  kaalude 
erinevus  on  kuuekümne  kordne  -  k￵ige  madalam  hinnang  antakse  artiklile 
populaarteaduslikus  ajakirjas  ja  k￵ige  k￵rgem  rahvusvahelises  erialases  k￵rge 
impact factor’iga  teadusajakirjas.  Kuigi TS  hindamise  näitajate ja nende  kaalude 
iga-aastane korrigeerimine v￵imaldab vähendada hindamissüsteemiga kohandumist 
ja  juhinduda  paremini  ülikooli  eesmärkidest,  on  see  probleemiks  teadust￶￶ 
suunamisel (vt ka Mingers, Willmott 2012).  
 
TTￜ MJ ei rakendata akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate TS iga-aastast hindamist p￵hjusel, et 
seda  peetakse  liialt  keeruliseks,  subjektiivseks ja  konflikte tekitavaks.  Samuti  on 
akadeemiliste t￶￶tajatega läbiviidavad hindamis- ja arenguvestlused vabatahtlikud ja 
juhuslikud ning olenevad allüksuse juhi personaalsest initsiatiivist. Ka üli￵pilaste 
tagasiside  küsitlused  on  väheesinduslikud  ning  teadus-  ja  ￵ppet￶￶ga  seonduvaid  
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probleeme arutatakse eelk￵ige mitteametlikus korras. Rakendatava süsteemi puudu-
seks on see, et t￶￶tajad taotlevad minimaalseid t￶￶koormusi ning pole motiveeritud 
täiendavat t￶￶d tegema. Väiksem t￶￶koormus v￵imaldab t￶￶aega kokku hoida ning 
selle arvelt näiteks ülikoolivälistele ettev￵tetele tasulisi konsultatsioone ja koolitusi 
teha.  Kuigi  TTￜ  MJ  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  p￵hipalgad  on  oluliselt  k￵rgemad 
TTￜ-s kehtestatud miinimumpalkadest vastavatel ametikohtadel, pole need piisavalt 
motiveerivad Tallinna ettev￵tete palgatasemetega v￵rreldes.  
 
Akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate TS hindamise detailne ja kvantitatiivne süsteem on Tￜ MJ-s 
ennast  paljude  aastate  jooksul  ￵igustanud,  kuid  hakanud  aasta-aastalt  üha  enam 
pidurdama teaduskonna arengut, samuti on hakanud akadeemilisi t￶￶tajaid üha enam 
häirima  rakendatava  TS  hindamise  süsteemi  keerukus,  administreerimine  ja 
ressursimahukus  (aegan￵udvus).  Osa  t￶￶tajaid  peab  vaadeldavat  süsteemi  ka 
vaatamata  laiap￵hjalistele  aruteludele  ja  demokraatlikule  otsustusprotsessile 
eba￵iglaseks, koost￶￶d takistavaks ja konflikte tekitavaks. Vaatamata intensiivsele 
kommunikatsioonile, info avalikustamisele ja osalevale juhtimisele (TS hindamise 
süsteemi  arendamisel  ja otsustamisel  saavad  osaleda  k￵ik  t￶￶tajad),  on  viimastel 
aastatel suurenenud rahulolematus TS juhtimise suhtes.  
 
Näiteks on vähenenud Tￜ MJ akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate toetus kvantitatiivse punkti-
süsteemi arendamisele (keskmine hinnang 2007 ja 2012 aastal vastavalt 3,2 ja 2,2 
palli  neljapallisel  skaalal).  Nimetatud  näitaja  on  ka  Tￜ  MJ-s  oluliselt  madalam 
v￵rreldes TTￜ MJ vastava näitajaga (keskmised hinnangud 2012 aastal vastavalt 2,2 
ja 3,3). Samuti on see professiooniti erinev – k￵ige negatiivsemalt suhtuvad kvanti-
tatiivsesse TS hindamise süsteemi teadurid ja vanemteadurid, kes soovivad raken-
dada ametikohast lähtuvat klassikalist TS hindamise ja t￶￶tasustamise süsteemi. 
 
Akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  grupiaruteludes,  intervjuudes  ja  ankeetküsitluse  vabades 
vastustes  esitatud  arvamused  TS  hindamise  ja  t￶￶tasustamise  kohta  on  paljudes 
küsimustes sarnased ning üldjuhul arvatakse, et TS hindamise täiendava ja detailse 
süsteemi  rakendamine  on  vajalik  ja  oluline.  Tänu  regulaarsele  ja  valdavalt 
esinduslikule  üli￵pilaste  tagasisidele,  aktsepteerib  enamus  Tￜ  MJ  akadeemilisi 
t￶￶tajaid ka üli￵pilashinnanguid kui personaalset tagasisidet, mis v￵imaldab saada 
taustainfot  ning  välja  selgitada  nn  probleemsed  ained  ja  ￵ppej￵ud.  Samas 
r￵hutatakse, et konkreetsete järelduste tegemine ja meetmete rakendamine eeldab 
iga olukorra sügavamat analüüsi. Samuti selgus, et ￵ppet￶￶ iga-aastast hindamist 
peetakse liialt lühikeseks perioodiks ning see peaks olema pikem. Arvatakse ka, et 
TS  hindamisel  on  keeruline  m￵￵ta  kvalitatiivsete  eesmärkide  täitmist,  mis 
v￵imaldab t￶￶tajatel p￵hieesmärkidest k￵rvale kalduda.  
 
Lisaks  eespool  toodule  avaldusid  ka  mitmed  vastandlikud  arvamused:  1)  TS 
hindamise süsteem on liialt detailne versus k￵iki tegevusi ja tulemusi ei arvestata 
piisaval määral; 2) t￶￶tajate madal kindlusetunne tuleviku ees versus kiirete muuda-
tuste vajadus. Vastandlikud arvamused viitavad ühelt poolt erinevatele huvidele ja 
eesmärkidele ning teiselt poolt akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate ülepingele ja frustratsioonile. 
Osa  akadeemilisi  t￶￶tajaid  süüdistab  oma  koormuste  suurenemises  (sama  v￵i  
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väheneva  t￶￶tasu  juures)  rakendatavat  TS  juhtimise  süsteemi,  kritiseerides  selle 
puudusi üldjuhul ￵igustatult, kuid jättes piisava tähelepanuta tegelikud globaalsed 
p￵hjused.  
 
Tￜ MJ TS juhtimise süsteemi arendamiseks viidi läbi seitse grupiarutelu ning nende 
raames t￶￶tati  välja  kaks alternatiivset TS  hindamise  süsteemi:  1)  arendati  edasi 
senist  kvantitatiivset  TS  hindamise  süsteemi,  2)  t￶￶tati  välja  kvalitatiivsetel 
näitajatel  p￵hinev  märksa  lihtsam  TS  hindamise  süsteem.  Viimane  v￵eti  aluseks 
professorite  TS  hindamise  ja  t￶￶tasustamise  süsteemi  väljat￶￶tamisel,  milles 
tasakaalustati  objektiivselt  hinnatavad  kvantitatiivsed  näitajad  subjektiivselt 
hinnatavate  kvalitatiivsete  näitajatega,  sh  näiteks:  ￵ppet￶￶  maht  doktori￵ppes, 
professori juhendamisel kaitstud doktori- ja magistrit￶￶de arv, üli￵pilashinnangute 
tulemused  k￵igis  ￵petatavates  ainetes  viimasel  kolmel  aastal,  teadusprojektide 
saamine ja neis osalemine, tipppublikatsioonide avaldamine ja Google-Scholar H-
indeks, ühiskondlik nähtavus ja ühiskonna teenimine. Nimetatud süsteemi eeskujul 
plaaniti  välja  t￶￶tada  TS  hindamise  süsteemid  ka  akadeemiliste  t￶￶tajate  teistele 
gruppidele, mis ei saanud aga t￶￶tajate heakskiitu. Paljud t￶￶tajad tunnetasid uues 
kavandatavas TS juhtimise süsteemis ohtu oma huvidele, samuti ei peetud usaldus-
väärseks subjektiivet hindamist.  
 
Eespool toodud vastuolud on tingitud akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate huvide ning ülikooli ja 
allüksuste eesmärkide ühildamise keerukusest, mida pingestavad eelseisvad suured 
muudatused. Nende ületamiseks oleks vaja välja t￶￶tada ja koosk￵lastada pikaaja-
lised eesmärgid, millest juhindumine v￵imaldab t￶￶tajatel fokuseerida oma tegevust 
￵ppe- ja teadust￶￶ kvaliteedi t￵stmise suunas, lähtudes ülikooli p￵hieesmärkidest. 
Rakendatavaid TS hindamissüsteeme on vaja edasi arendada ülikoolide arengust ja 
prioriteetidest  lähtuvalt,  sh  v￵iks  v￵tta  kasutusele  vähem  kuid  enam  kvaliteedile 
orienteeritud näitajaid,  sh näiteks tipp-publikatsioonide  avaldamise  allikate m￵ju-
faktori  ja  teadlaste  m￵jukuse  näitajad,  noorte  järelkasvu,  l￵petajate  konkurentsi-
v￵ime t￶￶turul jt, mis iseloomustavad senisest enam ülikoolide ja nende allüksuste 
ning akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate t￶￶ kvaliteeti ja arengut.  
 
Keerukate  ja  detailsete  TS  hindamise  süsteemide  abil  on  v￵imalik  suunata  ja 
kontrollida akadeemiliste t￶￶tajate tegevust, piirates aga sellega vabadust teha seda, 
mis  tagaks  sisemise  motivatsiooni.  Sel  teel  on  v￵imalik  tagada  t￶￶tajate  väline 
motivatsioon  ja  püstitatud  ülesannete  n￵uetekohane  täitmine,  mis  pidurdab  aga 
loovust  ja  innovatsiooni.  Keerukates  TS  juhtimise  süsteemides  hakkavad  parata-
matult domineerima kvantitatiivsed näitajad ning v￵imaldavad juhtidel eemalduda 
sisulisest  juhtimisest.  TS  juhtimise  süsteem  on  vaid  üks  juhtimisinstrument  ning 
selleks, et vältida TS juhtimise süsteemi domineerimist ja ühekülgset m￵ju ￵ppe- ja 
teadustegevusele,  on  vaja  rakendada  ka  muid  juhtimisinstrumente,  sh  kvaliteedi-
juhtimist. 
 
   